KARL DEUTSCH AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE


Nationalism and Social Communication. By Karl W. Deutsch. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966) x, 292 pp. $10.00, pap. $3.95


In the so-called “behavioral” phase of political science, Karl W. Deutsch occupies a place of major importance. His work reflects many of the major trends which have characterized political science in this phase: a quest for concepts of sufficient precision and applicability to provide the basis for the development of theory; the creation of operational (quantifiable) indicators for the testing of hypotheses about political behavior; and the adaptation and utilization of concepts, methodologies and insights from other disciplines. Deutsch’s writings not only reflect this emphasis but also represent a major contribution to political science at this stage in its development.

Although Deutsch has made specific contributions to most of the fields into which political science is generally divided, he has been principally concerned with the forces making for the integration and disintegration of political communities—questions of enduring importance which cut across such seemingly discrete fields as international relations, American federal and local government, political development and modernization, and nationalism in both its Western and non-Western settings.
This analysis focuses on this important aspect of Deutsch's writings and examines his major contributions to the study of politics at both the national and international levels. In his own intellectual development as a scholar in search of major concepts for the study of such phenomena, Deutsch is indebted to two persons in particular: Talcott Parsons and Norbert Wiener.

From Parsons' work in sociology Deutsch adapts the action system\(^1\) to the study of the political system. Although Deutsch has drawn upon much of Parsons' work on social systems,\(^2\) he has made most extensive use of one major part of the Parsonian system, namely, his four functional prerequisites for societal equilibrium and, ultimately, for the maintenance of the social system itself: (1) pattern maintenance—the ability of a system to ensure the reproduction of its own basic patterns, its values and norms; (2) adaptation to the environment and to changes in the environment; (3) goal attainment—the capacity of the system to achieve whatever goals the system has accepted or set for itself; and (4) integration of the different functions and subsystems into a cohesive, coordinated whole.

In the Parsonian social system, families and households are the subsystems which serve the function of pattern maintenance. Adaptation takes place in the economy and in areas of scientific and technological change. The polity, and especially the government, performs the function of goal attainment. The cultural subsystems, which include mass communications, religion, and education, fulfill the integrative function.

If Parsons is concerned with how social systems endure under stress, how they enhance their position or disintegrate, Deutsch

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\(^1\) Parsons developed an "action system" to be used as an analytical tool in sociology. He postulates an actor oriented toward attaining anticipated goals by means of a normatively regulated expenditure of energy. Since the relationships between the actor and his situation have a recurrent character or system, all action occurs in systems.

\(^2\) Parsons defines a social system as a "system of interaction of a plurality of actors, in which the action is oriented by rules which are complexes of complementary expectations concerning roles and sanctions. As a system, it has determinate patterns of structural change. It has, furthermore, as a system, a variety of mechanisms of adaptation to changes in the external environment. These mechanisms function to create one of the important properties of a system, namely, a tendency to maintain boundaries." Italics in original. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row [Torchbooks], 1962), pp. 195-196.
seeks to answer similar questions about political systems. According to Deutsch, similar functional prerequisites are performed by political systems. Deutsch's writings about political systems both at the national and international levels reflect this important aspect of Parsons' theory.

From the mathematician, Norbert Wiener, Deutsch utilizes concepts of cybernetics to develop operational indicators by which to measure the cohesiveness of political systems. In particular, Wiener's conception of communications definitively affected Deutsch's writings:

The existence of social science is based on the ability to treat a social group as an organization and not as an agglomeration. Communication is the cement that makes organizations. Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together and to act together. All sociology requires the understanding of communication.\(^3\)

Hence, Deutsch's emphasis on such indicators as mail flow, exchange of persons and trade in his systems theory, and in his theory of integration.

Deutsch's work embraces both the development of theory and its application to specific areas of inquiry. His principal theoretical contribution can be found in *The Nerves of Government*. Although it was written after he had published many other important books, Deutsch's earlier writings contain, in embryonic form, many of the ideas more fully expounded in this book.

In *The Nerves of Government*, however, to a greater degree than in any of his other writings, Deutsch's intellectual debt to Wiener and Parsons is evident. He writes that cybernetics "represents a shift in the center of interest from drives to steering, and from instincts to systems of decisions, regulation, and control, including the noncyclical aspects of such systems."\(^4\) The viewpoint of cybernetics as espoused by Wiener and utilized by Deutsch suggests that all organizations are alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every organization is held together by communi-


\(^4\) *The Nerves of Government*, p. 76.
cation. All political systems are crucially dependent on the flow of information for their survival and enhancement.

Communication, in turn, transfers information, which consists of a patterned relationship between events. Messages are transferred through channels of communication, some of which are likely to be more efficient than others. From the amount of information transmitted as contrasted with the amount lost, we may derive a measure of the efficiency of a channel as well as the relative efficiency or complementarity of any parts of the channel in relation to the others. Information passed from one unit to another can be measured in quantifiable terms. The extent to which information is distorted as it is transmitted into and through the system can be studied and measured, provided adequate data are available. Certain political systems have a greater capacity than others for receiving, storing, recalling and transmitting information accurately and rapidly. The capacity of a system to respond to inputs or demands as represented by information contained in messages provides an important indicator of its ability to endure under conditions of stress. Political systems, in this respect, like the human brain, are information-receiving and processing units. They store, recall, and recombine information needed to convert demands into responses. For the political system and for the human brain, the mark of genius is a capability to recall and recombine information in unusual and novel patterns. Like the telephone switchboard, political systems receive and transmit messages. Deutsch seeks to develop a framework designed to understand more clearly the conditions under which political systems, like telephone switchboards, become overloaded with incoming messages and fail somehow to convert such demands into adequate responses.

In his analysis, Deutsch identifies certain other concepts, namely, feedback and equilibrium, both of which have an important place in the literature of systems theory. In Deutsch’s systems model, feedback is a communications network “that produces action in response to an input of information, and includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behavior.” Stated differently, feedback represents an output which is returned to the system as an input. Equilibrium means simply a “return to a particular state which was disturbed.” Feed-

\footnote{Ibid., p. 88.}
back is measured by lag and gain. "Lag is the time that elapses between the moment a negative feedback system reaches a certain distance from its goal and the moment it completes corrective action corresponding to that distance. Gain means the extent of the corrective action taken" by the system in an effort to reach its goal. Clearly, if operational indicators of each of these variables could be developed and applied to the study of political systems, the result would be a major advance in our understanding of their capacity for survival under stress and their ability to adapt themselves to the demands imposed upon them.

In the political system, as conceptualized by Deutsch, certain types of feedback may be identified. The first is "goal-seeking" feedback, "the feedback of new external data into a net whose operating channels remain unchanged." The second is "learning," "the feedback of external data for the changing of these operating channels themselves." A third type of feedback, which scans internal data, is called "consciousness," which Deutsch defines as a "collection of internal feedbacks of secondary messages. Secondary messages are messages about changes in the parts of the system. Primary messages are those which move through the system in consequence of its interaction with the outside world." These secondary symbols of consciousness may change the behavior of the system.

As Deutsch suggests, such a model has potential utility for the study of a wide range of phenomena, be they decision-making units for the conduct of foreign policy, the political systems of advanced or less developed countries, or international organizations. Its primary deficiency lies in the difficulty of obtaining adequate data about primary and secondary messages or in tracing the flow of communications within political systems. This problem, not unique to the work of Deutsch, greatly reduces the prospects that a science of politics, envisaged in The Nerves of Government, can be developed.

Yet, if this formidable problem could be solved, political systems might be categorized, as Deutsch suggests, according to their ability to respond effectively to demands upon them. All political systems might be divided into four categories: (1) self-destroying systems,
which are likely to break down even in relatively favorable environments; (2) non-viable systems, which are not likely to survive under the range of difficulties found in most environments; (3) viable systems, which are likely to survive over a limited range of environmental conditions; and (4) self-enhancing systems, which are able to increase their probability of survival over a growing variety of environments. Such a typology would be based upon a theoretical framework which had both explanatory and predictive value. It would help to explain patterns of interaction within alternative types of political systems, while also setting forth a series of indicators of system change and breakdown.

Although efforts to develop typologies of political systems are as old as the writings of Aristotle, the achievement of an understanding of political systems adequate to explain and predict system breakdown would represent, of course, a major breakthrough toward the building of a more scientific discipline of political science. This, in turn, depends not only on the availability of adequate data but also upon the utilization of Deutsch's systems framework by many scholars in the study of political systems. This would call for a concerted effort by large numbers of scholars to apply Deutsch's framework to the study of, and collection of, data about a wide variety of political systems.

If the contribution of a scholar to his discipline lies in his capacity both for theorizing and for applying his theories to concrete problems, Deutsch has gained for himself a position of great scholarly importance, for he has devoted himself to the analysis of data in research based on his theological frameworks.

In Deutsch's writings there is considerable overlap in the substantive problems examined. Whether he studies nationalism, political modernization or the nature of integration at the international level, he is concerned with communications as represented by information feedback; the capacity of a system for the storage, retrieval and processing of information; the extent of interdependence among peoples over a wide range of goods and services, and social mobility of major groups within an existing or emerging political system. In fact, Deutsch utilizes similar concepts, indicators, and methods in the study of community formation, whether at the national or international level, and in the analysis of nationalism, integration, and political modernization. Implicit in his writings is the assumption that the integrative process bears many
similarities, even though it occurs in many seemingly discrete situations and contexts.

In the integration of political communities, Deutsch has chosen, of course, one of the enduring questions of political inquiry from Plato and Aristotle to the twentieth century, namely, how do political units gain and retain their political cohesiveness? Several major themes of integration can be found in Deutsch’s writings. First, he seeks an understanding of integration both as a \textit{process} and a \textit{condition}. This distinction, not unique to Deutsch’s writings, is important in the development of a more adequate conceptualization about integration. Like many other writers during the past generation, Deutsch seeks to create a model which explains the \textit{process} by which political communities become integrated. His work stops short of developing a model containing a series of specific stages with explicitly stated rules of transition from one stage to the next. He is unable to identify a sequence according to which integration proceeds. Instead, he suggests, the integrative process is not unilinear in nature. The essential background conditions do not come into existence at the same time nor are they established in any special sequence. “Rather it appears to us from our cases that they may be assembled in almost any sequence, so long as all of them come into being and take effect.”

Deutsch defines integration as a condition in which a group of people have “attained within a territory a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among peoples over a wide range of goods and services, and becomes evident in his definition of integration. Countries are “clusters of population, united by grids of communication flows and transport systems, and separated by thinly settled or nearly empty territories.”

This conception of integration leads to several problems in the utilization of Deutsch’s work for the study of integration. Not only is it difficult, if not impossible, to gain an adequate understanding of the \textit{sequence} in which the integrative process occurs but also

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  \item \textsuperscript{9}Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, p. 70.
  \item \textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 5.
\end{itemize}
it is difficult to know precisely when a political community has come into existence. For example, what level of transactions, quantitatively, is essential to enable us to say that a particular form of political community (amalgamated or pluralistic) exists? All that we know from this and other indicators is that peoples who are integrated, or integrating, experience a high level of communications. Nor do we know whether communications are the cause or the effect of integration. To what extent are communications the result of an integrative process? Alternatively, to what extent do they provide the foundation for the integrative process? If a more precise theory could be developed in which discrete stages of the integrative process were set forth, tentative answers to such questions might be found.

In focusing on integration as a process in the formation of political communities, Deutsch attempts to identify and examine variables which are common to integration in a wide range of settings. Implicit in Deutsch's writings is the assumption that the process of integration occurs in similar ways in seemingly widely separated cases. "Political integration is the process by which villages become districts, countries, or baronies, which, in turn, are combined into duchies or provinces, only to merge again into kingdoms. Kingdoms, in turn, have sometimes become consolidated into federations or empires."

Can certain features which are common to integration as a process be discerned from the comparative analysis of the formation of political communities? Deutsch seeks to answer this question by drawing upon the historical experience of nation-building in the North Atlantic area. In an interdisciplinary effort undertaken in the mid-1950's, Deutsch and his collaborators studied ten cases of integration and disintegration at the national level. The cases examined in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area included the American union in 1789; the Civil War and reunion; Irish independence in 1921; the union between England and

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12In an "amalgamated" security community, previously independent political units form a single unit with a common government. In a "pluralistic" security community, separate governments retain legal independence. The United States is illustrative of an amalgamated security community, while the United States-Canada, or France-Germany since World War II, may be called pluralistic security communities.

13Nationalism and Its Alternatives, p. 4.
Scotland in 1707; German unification until 1879; Italian unification, 1800-1860; the Habsburg Empire; the union of Norway and Sweden in 1814 and their separation in 1905; Swiss integration until 1848; the union of England and Wales after 1485; and the formation of England in the Middle Ages.

The comparative analysis undertaken in this study yielded several conclusions about the building of political communities. The integrative process included an increase in the political, economic, and social capabilities of political units. Larger, stronger, and more advanced political units formed the cores of strength around which weaker units grouped themselves and with which such units became integrated. For example, England, Prussia, and Sardinia-Piedmont provided core areas upon which the modern states of Britain, Germany, and Italy were created. In the nation-building experience, the core centers of strength appear to be vital to the modernizing, integrative process. In the enlargement of the Common Market, once again the core area phenomenon is present. Britain and other states such as Ireland, Denmark, and Norway have been attracted economically, and perhaps politically, to the core area of Western Europe represented by the European Community.

Another factor found to be of crucial importance pertained to the burdens imposed on the political units in establishing or maintaining either an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community. Such burdens were military and financial as well as social and economic costs. It was found that a “balance” between burdens and capabilities was essential for building and preserving either an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community, although Deutsch is not able to identify precisely the nature of that balance. At what point do the burdens become so excessive as to exceed the capabilities? What constitute the burdens and capabilities? Can all burdens and capabilities, including such factors as national morale and value systems, be adequately operationalized? Throughout his studies of integration, as well as his writings on international relations, can be found a predilection against conflict and force, which are alleged to have imposed excessive burdens on political communities and, as in the case of Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia, contributed to their disintegration. Implicitly, in Deutsch’s work, integration is posited as an alternative to conflict, and war
is considered to have imposed greater burdens on some political units than they were capable of bearing.

In the recent literature of integration, including the writings of Deutsch, there is no counterpart to the school of thought in the study of conflict which suggests that conflictual behavior plays an important integrative function. From Simmel to Coser in the literature of conflict, certain writers have seen conflict as providing the basis for the integration of groups and nations. According to such writers, conflict not only integrates but also helps to establish group identity, clarifies group boundaries, and contributes to group cohesion. “Out-groups” form the target of hostility for the “in-group.” If the fear of, or threat from, an external group is inadequate as a prerequisite for integration as Deutsch suggests, it perhaps deserves a more prominent place in the integrative process than accorded in the writings of Deutsch and many of his contemporaries.

In the formation of what Deutsch terms “amalgamated security communities,” several conditions were found to be essential in the historical cases of the North Atlantic area. They included compatible values which formed a common “way of life,” and the increase in widespread expectations of joint rewards for the participating units, especially in the economic sector. The core areas around which lesser units grouped themselves usually were units of superior economic growth and thus provided attractive partners for less economically dynamic units. Again, the experience of the European Community, conforms with this finding. The economic growth experienced by the Common Market provided a stimulus for Britain and other European counties to seek membership and for other states, both in Europe and elsewhere, to apply for associate status.

Broadening and thickening channels of communication among the “politically relevant strata” were found to be essential to amalgamation. The people of political units which are integrated, Deutsch suggests, possess the capacity to communicate with each other on a wide range of topics. “The community which permits a common

history to be experienced as common, is a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication . . . A larger group of persons linked by such complementary habits and facilities of communication we may call a people.”

Deutsch suggests that in the twentieth century, even though transactions among nations have risen dramatically, interdependence among nations remains far lower than interdependence within nations. In fact, in certain respects, as in foreign trade, most countries are less interdependent today than they were in the nineteenth century. If Deutsch’s analysis is correct, the prospects for the strengthening of international organization are not great although, as will be noted later, he places considerable emphasis on such structures for the development of a more peaceful international system. To be sure, Deutsch recognizes that communications among peoples in itself does not necessarily lead to integration. In fact, communications can produce either friendship or hostility depending on the extent to which the memories of communications are associated with more or less favorable emotions. In order to engage in conflict, peoples must have had some form of communication with each other. Nevertheless, the integration of political communities depends decisively on the flow of communications within the unit, as well as between the unit and the outside world.

Another condition which Deutsch finds to be essential in the integrative process is mutual predictability of behavior among the groups. This idea can be found also in Parsons’ social system, in which persons develop dependable expectations about each other’s behavior. As long as the actual behavior of persons accords with expectations of role partners, an essential ingredient in the integrative process exists. The maintenance of the cohesion of integrative

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16 Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 96.
16 Parsons’ action system places persons both in the role of subjects and in the role of objects. Subject (alter) and object (ego) interact in a system. If actors gain satisfaction, they develop a vested interest in the preservation and functioning of the system. Mutual acceptance of the system by the actors creates an equilibrating mechanism in the system. Supposedly, the course of action which the actor adopts is based on a previous learning experience as well as on his expectations about the behavior of the person with whom he is interacting. According to Parsons, interaction makes the development of culture possible at the human level, and provides a significant determinant of patterns of action in a social system. Interaction among acting subjects is crucial to Parsons’ framework. In a perfectly integrated social system the actors gratify each other’s specific needs.
relationships, no less than the political system itself, depends on the existence of such expectations about behavior. The great political, cultural, and ideological gaps which separate peoples at the international level undoubtedly diminish the prospects for the development of such expectations at the international level. Nevertheless, Deutsch examines several examples of such behavior in "pluralistic security communities," namely, the United States-Canada; the United States-Britain; and since World War II, France and Germany.

Although Deutsch's substantive contribution to the study of integration lies primarily in his studies about Western political systems, he has addressed himself to the study of nation-building in the non-Western world. He is concerned with social mobilization and modernization, urbanization, the "demonstration effect," the role of the mass media, monetization, literacy, the development of and the capacity of institutions to adapt to new demands upon them. He sets forth a series of indicators by which to measure the process of nation-building. These include: assimilated population (those who speak the predominant language); differentiated population (those who speak some other language); the frequency and range of communication across linguistic and cultural barriers; the rate of mobilization of population into a group having more intensive communication; the rate of assimilation of new groups into the predominant group; the balance of material rewards, usually in terms of employment, income, security or prestige; and the penalties for nonassimilation.

Particularly appropriate to his work in this field is his notion that "a people forms a social, economic, and political alignment of individuals from different social classes and occupations, around a center and a leading group. Its members are united by more intensive social communication, and are linked to these centers and leading groups by an unbroken chain of connections in communications, and often also in economic life, with no sharp break in the possibilities of communication and substitution of any link, and hence with a somewhat better probability of social rise from rank to rank." ¹⁷ Thus, political development and modernization, as an integrative process, represent the mobilization of increasing

¹⁷Nationalism and Social Communication, p. 75.
numbers of people who become conscious of a common identity and possess a capacity for a wide range of communications both among themselves and with their political leaders.

In such studies, indicators similar to those contained in other works by Deutsch on political integration are utilized. The flow of mail and trade transactions, the geographic mobility of persons, and the extent of the readership of newspapers, the ratio between rural and urban population, the composition of the labor force ("new" occupations as compared with employment in traditional economic sectors) all provide indicators which can be quantified for the measurement of political development and modernization.

Yet, the problems of data collection for less developed countries are formidable. Statistical sources are often either faulty or non-existent. Disparate methods of collecting and classifying data make difficult the conduct of research at a comparative level or over time for even a single country. Nevertheless, if it were possible to test a theory of political development and modernization, such as that set forth by Deutsch, we would have gained not only important insights into the process of nation-building but also a series of conclusions having policy relevance for modernizing states.

Deutsch's study of integration at the international level is focused on the experience of Western Europe over the past generation. It is useful to examine in some detail Deutsch's analysis of European integration because of the controversial nature of the findings and the research techniques employed. In a study completed in the mid-1960's, several techniques were used: interviews conducted with French and West German elites; public opinion surveys based on samples of between one and two thousand voters; and a systematic content analysis of selected newspapers in the United States, Britain, France, and the German Federal Republic. An attempt was made to identify trends within the press which corresponded to similar trends revealed in the elite interviews and public opinion polls. Finally, data were gathered about "actual behavior," defined by such indicators as trade transactions and travel abroad. Deutsch and his collaborators sought to identify any increases or decreases in these transactions between the countries of Western Europe as compared to such transactions within the country.

Deutsch's findings about European integration, and the critique of them, are indicative of the primitive state of our knowledge
KARL DEUTSCH

about the study of integration. He concluded that “European integration has slowed since the mid-1950’s and it has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-58.” In part, he based this conclusion on the fact that since then there had been no increases in transactions “beyond what one would expect from mere random probability and increase in prosperity in the countries concerned.” This finding is confirmed, according to Deutsch, by the other indicators used in the study. These included the content analysis of major newspapers, in which column inches devoted to European integration were coded, and the conduct of interviews among a select group of elites in major West European countries.

The validity of Deutsch’s conclusions, of course, depends upon the reliability of his indicators of integration. If, for example, we use an institutional indicator, we may conclude, as some students of integration have, that there was substantial progress toward European integration in the 1960’s. Only after 1958 did the European Economic Community develop the institutions and practices which made possible the common commercial and agricultural policies. The European Community Agricultural Policy was set forth in the Rome Treaty only in general terms. It remained for the six members of the Common Market to develop the detailed framework for its operation in the early sixties. Whatever one’s view of the results of their efforts, the very fact that they reached agreement in an area in which special interest groups have long reigned supreme at the national level must rank as a major accomplishment in the integrative process. Thus, although the Rome Treaty provided the legal framework for the EEC, the Six only evolved the complex agreements essential for the operation of the Common Market during the 1960’s. Moreover, only in the late 1950’s and after did the Six negotiate as a unit with outside countries. The emergence of the EEC as a powerful unit negotiating trade agreements with a large number of outside governments, including the United States in the Kennedy Round, and Britain in the negotiations for British entry, clearly introduced a new dimension to European diplomacy and into the integrative process at the international level—a dimension which is absent from an analysis based on Deutsch’s model on the integrative process.

Attitudinal data gathered and analyzed by other students of

18France, Germany, and the Western Alliance, pp. 218-219.
European integration yield conclusions dramatically different from those of Deutsch. For example, a sample of youths from several schools considered to be representative of important social and economic groups in Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany revealed strongly positive attitudes toward European integration. The assumption in such studies is that persons receive their basic political orientation at a relatively young age. The youth studied in the sample received their political orientation at a time when nationalism was less in favor than it had been when the present generation of leaders were young. If such attitudes do not change greatly, it is possible to project from these data and anticipate that the current generation of youth in Western Europe will manifest a relatively "European" outlook when they become adults. The strengthening of positive attitudes toward integration among European youth in the 1960's thus represents an important integrative trend. Yet, the utility of such a finding depends upon both the definition and the indicators of integration utilized.

Deutsch may be faulted for using data without discriminating among the various categories of transactions. For example, the increase in communications among certain groups of persons may be more important to an understanding of integration than a rise in the aggregate of all communications. Certain kinds of communications may be more important than others both as indicators of, and catalysts toward, integration. An excessive emphasis on the quantitative may lead to a neglect of the qualitative dimension of integration. For example, should we focus on the analysis of data about transactions among important elites in Europe in business, agriculture, the trade union movement, and the academic community rather than communications in the aggregate? In each of these areas, according to a study by Carl J. Friedrich, there has been a marked increase in contacts across frontiers and support among such groups for European integration. Increased cross-national contacts among businessmen, labor and agricultural groups provided evidence of a more qualitative nature than those of Deutsch and his associates. Clearly, some persons and groups,

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more than others, shape the integrative movement and the political process in general. A focus on behavior at an aggregate level or even at an elite level may obscure the crucial integrative role of one or a few persons or groups.

The lack of agreement among writers about European integration bespeaks a more fundamental problem in the literature of integration. Like the proverbial blind man who touches the elephant and describes that small part which he touches, students of integration have yet to see clearly and fully the phenomenon they seek to describe and explain. So long as writers have quite different definitions of integration and indicators of the integrative process, they are not likely to agree on the status of the phenomenon they are studying. Whatever the outcome of efforts to produce a model, or models, of integration, the writings of Deutsch will provide one major source of propositions and indicators. If Deutsch has not fully discerned the elephant, he has at least seen a major portion and provided important theoretical and substantive insights into the study of integration.

New models for the study of integration should incorporate propositions from the neo-functionalist writings of the past generation as well as writings which emphasize the role of coercion and the impact of the international system and its political environment upon integration. The conception of integration as a phenomenon in which conflict has no major part, suggested earlier, is especially evident in the literature about postwar Europe. Yet, it is difficult to understand postwar European integration without reference to conflict. Students of postwar Europe agree, in general, that the experience of World War II provided an important catalyst in the postwar European integration movement. The disillusionment with the nation-state as a result of World War II led Europeans to experiment with novel forms of integration.

Similarly, greater emphasis should be placed on the international environment within which the integrative process takes place. While the perception of threat from the Soviet Union did not provide the sole catalyst toward European integration, it cannot be ignored as one important input from the international environment which shaped the postwar European system.

In his writings on integration, Deutsch has evolved a theoretical framework based on a consensual approach. Integration occurs as peoples, for a variety of reasons described above, find areas of com-
monality of interest and expectations of joint reward. Force is consigned to a minimal role. While core areas themselves are identified, we find little place in Deutsch’s writings for the coercive capabilities which are often employed in the integrative process. To understand the unification of Germany without the “blood and iron” of Bismarck; the unification of the United States without the conquest of the South in the Civil War; the building of modern Russia without the force employed by the Tsars and their successors; or more recently the preservation of the Congo by the defeat of secessionist movements, is once again to ignore an important set of variables. Conflict may be important both as a precondition for integration and as a part of the integrative process itself. To neglect such variables in a theory of integration is no less risky than to attribute the integrative process solely to coercive elements. Both as a process and a condition, the study of integration is in need of theoretical frameworks which relate both conflictual and consensual variables.

In his work about international politics, no less than in his writings about integration, Deutsch makes extensive use of concepts developed elsewhere in his studies. The functional prerequisites adopted from Parsons are utilized for the analysis of international politics. For example, in his examination of power both as a means and an end in international politics, he suggests:

In a political system, power is used for all basic system functions—pattern maintenance, adaptation, goal attainment, and integration. Where power fails, any and all of these functions may be endangered. Often, therefore, where compliance and persuasion fail, power is invoked; where power fails, force is called in; where force fails, withdrawal is attempted. Where even withdrawal fails, or is impractical, tensions and frustrations rise within the system, and its functions of adaptation must be improved correspondingly; or else, where adaptation and integration fail, pattern maintenance is endangered, and the breakdown of the system becomes imminent.21

According to Deutsch, such situations “breed war.” Acknowledging here, in contrast to his other writings on integration, the role of power and coercion, Deutsch calls for the abolition of war. This, he declares, “must be done substantially within the rest of

21The Analysis of International Relations, p. 47.
this century, if all-out nuclear war is not to abolish the whole vulnerable civilization of cities and factories on which our lives depend." Thus, Deutsch presents a foreboding future for the international system. His prognosis becomes all the more somber when he sets forth the requirements for averting global catastrophe by the end of this century.

Of major importance to Deutsch, therefore, is the quest for answers to the fundamental question of when, where, and how nations get into wars and out of them. We must understand the sources and forms of wars and the nature of the actors—nations, governments, and influential groups—who are likely to engage in conflict at the international level. Deutsch calls for unprecedented breakthroughs in the social sciences toward an understanding of international conflict. His assumption is that, having gained such understanding, peoples would forego war for peace. He thus calls for a transformation in human behavior as remarkable as the advances which he proposes in the social sciences. The political transformation for which Deutsch calls at the international level far exceeds both in scope and in rapidity those which he describes in the development historically of political communities at the national level. If the prospects for their realization in the international system of the next generation are minimal, the question remains as to whether Deutsch's assessment of the future is accurate.

Deutsch's analysis of international relations is based upon several basic assumptions: (1) that national security interests and governmental organizations for their attainment dominate the foreign policy activities of any large nation (undefined in his writings, except to include the United States, the Soviet Union, and "possibly" China); (2) that a nation's feeling of insecurity expands directly with its power (a kind of Parkinson's law of national security); (3) that warlike interest groups which are self-perpetuating play a major role in the foreign policy process of large powers; (4) that the actions of each actor serve as starting points for similar counteractions by the other actor, with international politics thus characterized as an interactive process; and (5) that conflict among nations can be reduced by increasing the salience and weight of parallel interests among nations in a strategy of "conflict-reduction" and "potential integration." Although only a few nations have succeeded, historically, in

\[22\text{Ibid.}\]
reducing the threat of international conflict to their existence or prosperity, new or improved instruments, such as international law and organization, as well as federalism and supranational integration, Deutsch maintains, may make a major contribution to the reduction or elimination of conflict.

In contrast to such techniques for the management and reduction of power at the international level, Deutsch sees little prospect for the achievement of a more peaceful world under conditions of mutual deterrence. He criticizes deterrence theory for its assumption of unchanging motives and perceptions. Both sides may attach different values to alternative outcomes. One may be prepared to take greater risks than the other and thus lead to the breakdown of deterrence. If Deutsch is correct in suggesting the possibility of changing motives of actors in a deterrence relationship, might not such changes in behavior characterize actors in alternative models? Can we assume that international behavior, even in the best of worlds, is not subject to change leading either toward or away from conflict? Precisely because of the existence of this possibility, nations historically have armed themselves, even if they were essentially status quo powers. The assumption of deterrence theory is that nations are less prone toward aggressive behavior if the risks which they would incur outweigh the potential gains. Deutsch's alternative to deterrence would either necessitate, or presuppose, a radical transformation in international behavior to a level of mutual trust and an absence of conflicting interests such as has seldom characterized relations among nations. Until that time, nations are likely to seek security in a deterrent relationship, even though they hopefully will strive for the limitation of armaments to the lowest level necessary to assure deterrence.

Deutsch's assumption that national security interests and governmental organizations dominate the foreign policy activities of any large nation raises more questions than it answers. It takes little account of the major differences among nations which affect greatly their respective conception of foreign policy. If large nations have global interests, presumably, they must mobilize large-scale resources for their attainment and preservation. Yet, the United States, for much of its twentieth century history, clearly did not have either global interests or a vast foreign affairs-national security complex, even though it was a large power.

The assumption, furthermore, that warlike interest groups which are self-perpetuating play a dominant role in the foreign policy of
large powers is equally questionable. Such groups undoubtedly exist in many states, although their strength, and even existence, has never been adequately studied either in the United States or in other countries where sufficient information might be available. A major difficulty arises in the establishment of a linkage between such groups and foreign policy. Despite the widespread assumption about the existence of the "military-industrial complex," is it really possible to establish a causal relationship between any phenomenon and the formulation of foreign policy?

Foreign policy is the amalgam of many factors. To be sure, domestic groups and interests undoubtedly play a role in its formulation. But national interests and foreign policy goals are not necessarily the product of self-perpetuating elites which, if changed, would necessarily alter the goals of a state. The radical transformation of the elites of states historically has not always resulted in the fundamental alteration of their foreign policy goals. Conceivably, states have certain enduring foreign policy goals and conceptions of national interest which are not easily changed, even by the transfer of political power to different elites.

Throughout Deutsch's work on international relations runs the theme that international relations is largely an interactive process which he likens to a fight between dogs or small boys. "A dog meeting another dog in the street may growl at him; the second dog growls back. The first dog growls louder, and the second still more so. The first dog snarls, and so does the second. In the classic sequence of escalation there follow bared teeth, snaps, and a dog-fight." Deutsch contends that arms races and confrontations among great powers bear great similarity to such small group interaction. But a fundamental question must be posed: If one side arms or behaves aggressively, would a decision by the other not to arm or respond result either in a more peaceful world, or in a world in which the side choosing not to respond could live in accordance with its own values? Nations, like the dogs in Deutsch's model, may respond to provocations in order to survive or to preserve values which ultimately they may deem to be more important than survival itself.

The interactive model assumes, moreover, that responsibility for conflict can be equally apportioned between major protagonists.

23 Ibid., p. 113.
This may not be necessarily the case. It ignores the difference between the status quo and the anti-status quo power. The former seeks to avoid conflict, if possible, while striving to preserve what it possesses, while the anti-status quo power appears as the challenger. To assert that international politics, under such conditions, is an interactive process is to provide little insight into the divergent motivations and goals which shape relationships between the protagonists and which lead one power to defend its interests in the face of aggressive behavior by the other.

Another problem associated with an interaction model of international behavior stems from its basic assumption: that choices by one power result from and influence decisively the decisions of the opposing state. This model has its current application, as Deutsch maintains, in the study of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is especially prominent in discussions of the arms race between the superpowers. The Soviet weapons program of the past decade is attributed to a reaction to decisions taken by the United States in the building of our nuclear capability. Here again, we confront one of the most powerful, yet untested and perhaps untestable, assumptions of international politics. A model which relies solely upon a stimulus-response relationship may be faulty. Conceivably, certain decisions about armaments, both in the Soviet Union and the United States, are taken independently of choices made by the opposing superpower. If the security requirements as perceived respectively by U.S. and Soviet leaders differ greatly because of widely separate historical experiences, geographic location, technological capabilities, decision-making systems, and national goals, does an interaction model suffice to explain their national security policies?

Having analyzed the formidable problems of achieving integration both at the national and international levels, Deutsch nevertheless views the building of a global political community as vital to the future of mankind. He admits that, at best, pluralistic security communities are likely to characterize the international system of the near future. "In the long term, however, the search for integrated political communities that command both peace and power, and that entail a good deal of amalgamation, is likely to continue until it succeeds." 24 However desirable the creation of such a world, we

must devise appropriate frameworks for the management of power and the conduct of foreign relations in the interim—which is likely to be much longer than Deutsch anticipates. Even the formation of a world based on a series of pluralistic security communities may be distant, for such an international system presumes a high degree of harmony of interest among nations and a willingness to forego war in the resolution of differences. If Deutsch excludes from his model a level of deterrence adequate to reinforce such a willingness to avert resort to conflict, the prospects for the world which he envisages may be even more remote. Nevertheless, like many other writers, Deutsch has held forth a noble goal for nations both in the short term and the long term.

Deutsch, the theorist in quest of precision based on quantification, is nevertheless the political scientist imbued with values he is loath to exclude from his writings. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he has not striven to produce a value-free political science. Even though the intrusion of values on occasion may have had a deleterious effect on his research, he has never sought to hide them from the reader. In this respect, Deutsch has sought to combine the quest for more precise theories, characteristics of the political science of the past generation, with an earlier quest for a normative theory of politics. Thus, he has combined traditional and contemporary approaches to the study of political science.

Whatever one’s view of certain aspects of Deutsch’s theorizing or the conclusions to which he is led by his value-orientation, his work has reflected a deep and sophisticated knowledge of history and other disciplines, the heritage of his European background, and a mastery of the quantitative tools of contemporary American political science. In this respect, he towers over many of his contemporaries whose approaches to political science have been either quantitative or qualitative, each to the exclusion of the other. In his utilization of the knowledge imparted by many disciplines, traditional and contemporary, in his effort to link empirically-based theory and normative theory, Deutsch has established standards and goals which are likely to characterize political science in a “post-behavioral” phase in the 1970’s and to make his work of continuing interest to political scientists for many years to come.

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